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Abstract 
 
This paper constructs an alternative account of resource stewardship at General Motors (GM) 
during the period 1909-1940. Alfred Chandler employed GM in his text ‘Strategy and 
Structure’ to explain the development of the modern corporation. This understanding can be 
employed to contrast an ‘old-economy’ with a ‘new-economy’ financialized corporate 
business model. In this paper we find that many elements of the financialized firm were 
present in the early history of GM’s development. Our analysis reveals the financialization of 
a non-financial corporation and how this influenced corporate behaviour and impacted on 
financial performance at GM during the period 1909 to 1940. 
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Highlights 
 
General Motors is a key case study in Alfred Chandler’s (1962) text 'Strategy and Structure'  
 
US corporations are now financialized with this 'new-economy business model' displacing 
the ‘old-economy’ productive business model  
 
We find that many elements of a financialized firm/new economy business model 
influenced corporate behaviour at GM during its early development phase 1909 to 1940 
 
This study on GM explores to what extent the financialization of a non-financial corporation 
not only modified corporate behaviour but also transformed financial performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims to modify our understanding of the management and stewardship of 
corporate resources in General Motors (GM) during its formative years from 1909 to 1940. 
GM holds an iconic place in international business history as it is one of the American 
industrial groups at the centre of Chandler's analysis of the dynamics of managerial 
capitalism. Significantly, Chandler's work led to a lasting legacy in contemporary business 
history, namely the conceptualization and implementation of a general interpretative 
paradigm to analyse the emergence and development of modern industrial capitalism 
(Fligstein, N, 2007; Wilson and Toms, 2012). This revolved around the relation between 
strategy and structure and how these elements interconnect in a way that underwrites long-
term competitive industrial groups. Accordingly, it was possible to identify common 
trajectories and dynamics. These centred on the implementation of ‘investments’ in 
productive capacity and its coordination within a multi-divisional structure or M-form 
organisation. And how, in combination, investment within the M-form organization could 
help to minimize transaction costs, maximize throughput, and inflate returns on capital. Thus, 
investments in minimum efficient size and a separation between ownership and control 
associated with M-form organization provided a 'template' upon which to judge the presence 
of national and regional trends towards modern economic development (or the lack thereof).  
 
Over the years, empirical research exposed various limitations in Chandler’s work. For 
example, Chandler did not entirely grasp how national differences in institutional frameworks 
of corporate governance affect managerial accountability and variations in scale and scope 
economies (Toms and Wilson, 2010). Furthermore, Chandler’s narrative tends to depict the 
emergence of multi-divisionalization as the outcome of a ‘discovery’ that suddenly changed 
the US economy from the 1910s onwards (Chandler, 1962). Nonetheless, empirical research 
suggests that in most cases multi-divisionalization was actually the outcome of a path-
dependent process of incremental transformation (Quail, 2008). Finally, Chandler identifies 
the separation between ownership and control as the ‘historical’ phenomenon that defines 
‘modern’ American industrial capitalism. Although it has been noted by Foreman-Peck and 
Hannah (2013) that ownership was more separated from control in the largest stock market 
of 1911 (London) than in the largest stock market in 1995 (New York).  
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Nonetheless, by addressing organizations as evolving institutional forms, Chandler changed 
the way corporations were perceived. His analysis implied a business model based on the 
coordinated and efficient expansion of physical assets that could achieve efficiency combined 
with growth (Quail, 2008:127). Thus, in spite of its limitation, Chandler’s interpretative 
framework still holds substantial currency in contemporary debates about industrial 
development and sustaining competitiveness. For example, Lazonick employs a specific 
interpretation of the ‘Chandlerian’ corporation to construct a dichotomy between ‘old 
economy’ business models which are committed to product and process renewal, 
employment and reinvestment, and ‘new economy’ business models characterized as being 
‘financialized’ (Lazonick, 2010 and 2013). Lazonick employs the term financialization to 
describe how a ‘new economy’ business model replaced an ‘old economy’ business model 
where managers were committed to product and process innovation. This change to a ‘new 
economy’ form of corporate behaviour has, since the 1980s’ according to Lazonick, 
progressively undermined US competitiveness and economic growth. Lazonick’s argument is 
that senior executives, in the financialized corporation, are motivated by financial incentives 
tied to delivering shareholder value performance metrics. These financial metrics coupled to 
the award of stock options and additional bonuses have encouraged US managers to 
distribute profit rather than reinvest in productive innovation necessary to sustain US 
competitiveness. Lazonick notes that ‘by the 1980s ... the retain-and-reinvest investment 
strategies of many established U.S. industrial corporations had become vulnerable’ (Lazonick, 
2015:6). This recent financialization of the US corporation has been represented as a new 
form of institutional and cultural logic which drives managers to adhere to shareholders 
demands and which has ‘profoundly reorganized the American Corporation’ (Soener, 2015).  
 
In Chandler’s 1962 text ‘Strategy and Structure’ GM is one of four extended company cases 
employed to describe how changes in organisation form facilitated the productive co-
ordination and stewardship of resources from ‘the purchase of supplies to the final sale to 
the customer’ (Chandler, 1962:145).  In this paper we argue that many elements of the ‘new 
economy’ or ‘financialized’ corporation are also present influencing GMs corporate behaviour 
and financial development.  To structure our argument and the supporting analysis we 
employ four organizing elements drawn from the financialization literature.  Krippner, for 
example, observes that financialization is about changes in the composition of corporate 
4 
 
balance sheets from tangible to financial asset accumulations where: ‘Non-financial 
corporations are beginning to resemble financial corporations – in some cases, closely – and 
we need to take this insight to our studies of corporate behaviour’ (Krippner, 2005:201). 
Second, financial incentives included in remuneration packages, such as stock options and 
profit share schemes encourage the alignment of managerial and employee interests with 
that of stockholders (Lazonick, 2015; Fligstein and Shin, 2007). Third, these incentives 
manifest in the financialized firm as a commitment, by managers, to ‘downsize and distribute’, 
that is, prioritise the distribution of profits to satisfy the demands from shareholders at the 
expense of reinvesting in firm competitiveness (Lazonick, 2015). Finally, we draw upon the 
Froud et al’s (2006) argument that financialization can be understood as the intrusion of 
capital markets and how this encourages optimistic managerial narratives about strategic 
intervention(s) and financial transformation.  Using reported financial numbers at both a 
macro and firm-level Froud et al reveal that, in the financialized firm, contradictory forces are 
in play limiting the transformation of a firm’s return on capital employed for shareholder 
value (Froud et al, 2006: 65-94).   
 
Chandler (1962) frames his analysis of the development of GM as structure and strategy 
whereby a decentralized co-ordinated organization structure facilitates the stewardship and 
deployment of resources. Alfred Sloan, in his text My Years with General Motors, also 
reinforces the importance of policy formation (strategy) and the co-ordination of GM’s 
divisional resource management through ‘co-ordination by committee’ and its associated use 
of ‘financial controls’ (Sloan, 1964).  Our supplementary argument is that at an early stage in 
its development GMs corporate behaviour incorporates many elements of the new economy 
financialized firm.  
 
Sloan, for example, devotes a chapter in My Years with General Motors to the General Motors 
Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) and the importance of providing credit finance to customers 
and another chapter on the creation of, and investment by, GM into a holding company to 
underwrite dealership financing and risk management. Both GMAC and the Holding Company 
were heavily capitalized to facilitate credit finance to customers and thereby support the 
conversion of mass-produced outputs into costs recovered and profits realized.  GM’s 
corporate behaviour, at this early stage of its development, resembled the modus operandi 
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of a financial corporation in terms of raising and issuing bonds, generating wholesale funds 
and providing different types of credit funding and insurance products to customers1. Sloan 
devotes yet another chapter to broad company-level ‘incentive compensation’ schemes 
where the purpose of these was to ensure senior executives and employees were ‘partners’ 
sharing in profits and capital gains from GM’s profit and stock price performance. The purpose 
of these incentive plans was not only to hold on to or limit senior staff turnover but also align 
staff financial interests with those of GM’s stockholders. In a further chapter ‘Financial 
Growth’ Sloan justifies the generous distribution of profit to stockholders on the basis that 
they would, at times, be called upon to provide additional refinancing facilities if, and when, 
GM was short of cash.  He was also aware that contradictory forces operated to constrain the 
transformation of GM’s return on capital noting that: ‘Due to the force of economic necessity 
and through a process of evolution, the units of industry have become larger and larger....The 
effect of such an evolution on the capital structure is to require ever increasing amounts of 
capital’ (Sloan, 1964:213). There is a trade-off between lowering prices to stimulate demand 
and the additional capital required to increase supply ‘Reduction of price might broaden the 
scope of demand, and afford an enlargement of volume highly beneficial, even though the 
rate of return on capital might be lower’ (Sloan, 1964:141).  
 
 
2. General Motors Corporate Behaviour:  Strategy, Structure and Financialization  
 
Chandler’s classic text Strategy and Structure (1962)’ and Sloan’s My Years with General 
Motors (1964) are reflective accounts of the development of GM during its early history. 
These accounts of GM’s industrial development also provide a more general template upon 
which to analyse the emergence and development of modern industrial capitalism. In 
Chandler’s work on the modern American corporation the framing sets up policies to secure 
growth in output as ‘strategy’ and that the organization devised to administer these enlarged 
activities and resources, a ‘structure’ (Chandler, 1962:13).  As the demand for industrial 
output expanded this, in turn, generated the need for an appropriate structure which ‘can be 
defined as the design of the organization through which the enterprise is administered’ 
                                            
1 As from 1925 GM provided customers with insurance protection policies against fire, theft and collision 
though GMs subsidiary ‘General Exchange Insurance Corporation’ (Sloan, 1964:307) 
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(Chandler, 1962:13). An organization’s structure is a response to the need to manage 
increasing complexity as volumes increase and geographic dispersion is brought about by the 
need to produce and sell into a larger global market.  
 
Chandler observes that, in the case of GM, the expansion of business volume, mix of products 
and geographic span of operations led to problems of organization. ‘The relations between 
operating divisions and between the divisions and the general office became more haphazard, 
less coordinated, and less supervised than they had been under Storrow and Nash’ (Chandler, 
1962:125). This interpretation of events conjoins issues of organization with personality and 
leadership and Chandler observed: ‘Although the lack of any effective over-all administrative 
structure failed to disturb Durant… it did trouble the du Ponts’ Chandler, 1964:125). The du 
Ponts made moves to install changes after their first major investment in GM, for example, 
requesting that capital appropriations be managed in a similar way to that at du Pont. Sloan 
recalls this change in approach at the Finance Committee meeting in November of 1919 
during which GM executives had agreed to raise $50 million in debenture stock and a possible 
additional $50 million. The failure to generate this external funding (only $11 million was 
raised) illuminated, according to Sloan, a conflict of realities whereby raising funds from the 
capital market needed to be juxtaposed with an internal system of capital appropriation 
arrangements that established a competition for funds rather than allocation by committee 
vote.  
 
The failure to generate external funding and the subsequent collapse in revenues forced GM 
into a series of organizational adjustments focused upon the central co-ordination and 
management of capital allocations into the divisions, cash control, inventory management 
and production control. In each case the responsibility for financial control becomes located 
within the Executive and Finance Committee. In turn this committee needed to be furnished 
with information about sales, production inventory and cash management and competitive 
bids for financial capital working back from a forecast of how many cars GM could be expected 
to sell. In terms of facilitating the decentralized responsibilities with co-ordinated divisional 
control within GM Sloan observes that the critical element is the financial side of things.  
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It was on the financial side that the last necessary key to decentralization with co-
ordinated control was found. That key, in principle, was the concept that, if we had 
the means to review and judge the effectiveness of operations, we could safely leave 
the prosecution of these operations to the men in charge of them. The means as it 
turned out was a method of financial control which converted the broad principle of 
return on investment into one of the important working instruments for measuring 
the operations of the divisions. The basic elements of financial control in General 
Motors are cost, price, volume and rate of return on investment (Sloan, 1964:140). 
 
The central contribution of both Chandler and Sloan is that they draw our attention to 
business strategy as being decided and formulated by boards of senior executives in 
responses to changes in market demand, new product technologies and opportunities to 
generate a return on investment for shareholders. This process of strategy formulation is 
supplemented with another supportive narrative that describes how divisional managers are 
free to manage their own divisions subject to policies established by the executive committee, 
for example, volume of production, type of product and price bracket, subject to certain cost 
limits.  
The co-ordination of the activities of all these divisions must be such that there will be 
no undue conflict, competitively, between the product of one division and that of 
another. General policies must be determined from the standpoint of the corporation 
as a whole, rather than from that of any one division. Each of these divisions is 
conducted as a business in itself. The responsible head operates the business with no 
other limitation than at which has been established by the policy of the corporation, 
expressed through its executive committee (Raskob, 1927:131). 
 
Chandler develops and extends his thesis about business strategy and structure in The Visible 
Hand (1977) in terms of the nature of hierarchy and the internalization of transactions within 
organizations rather than markets. This is again further reinforced in his text Scale and Scope 
(1990). The object of these texts is to provide an explanation for the development of industrial 
capitalism and its dynamics within a ‘productionist’ framework. Chandler’s organizing 
elements focus on production, distribution and management where marketing and market 
sensing provide information to plan physical production schedules, product mix, revenues, 
expenses and return on capital within organization structures that facilitate professional 
management.  
 
In contrast the term financialization is a relatively new organizing concept and it is often 
employed to describe the behaviour of contemporary business enterprise and trajectory of 
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economic development. At a macro-economy level Krippner describes this economic 
development as a compositional shift in national balance sheets from productive tangible 
assets to financial assets that can be more easily traded or used to lever additional profit. 
However, this macro-analysis is then employed to frame an argument for future research 
about corporate behaviour where ‘non-financial corporations are beginning to resemble 
financial corporations’ (Krippner, 2005:202) 
 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) and Lazonick (2012) argue that financialization modifies 
corporate governance and resource stewardship from its traditional productionist values. The 
business model of re-investing funds into the firm to promote innovation for economic 
development and competitiveness has been replaced with one that promotes the distribution 
of cash earnings to shareholders. Lazonick argues that performance metrics linked to 
managerial remuneration and specifically the award of stock option bonuses encouraged US 
managers to progressively ‘downsize and distribute’. This is evidenced, by Lazonick, as a shift 
away from profits reinvested towards earnings distributed to fund dividends and/or finance 
the buyback of shares for treasury stock. In a recent Guardian article Lazonick observes that 
‘for the period 2001-2010, 86 of Britain's largest companies that are included in the S & P 
Europe 350 index made €882bn in net profits of which 63% was paid out in dividends. 
 
By financialization, I mean the evaluation of the performance of a company by a 
financial measure such as earnings per share. The manifestation of the financialization 
of the US economy is the obsession of corporate executives with distributing ‘value’ 
to shareholders in the form of stock repurchases, even if it is at the expense of 
investment in innovation and the creation of US employment opportunities (Lazonick, 
2010:6). 
 
Froud et al (2006) reinforce this idea about the intrusion of the capital market into firms and 
how this serves to align managerial and investor interests. However, Froud et al argue, are 
careful to avoid the argument that this financialization of corporate strategy also transformed 
financial performance. Rather they observe that in the financialized firm managerial 
narratives often tend to exaggerate the potential for corporate financial transformation in an 
attempt to boost stock prices. Using national accounting data and detailed firm-level case 
studies Froud et al argue that the transformation in return on capital employed (ROCE) has 
generally been disappointing. Their argument is that in the financialized firm the financial 
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numbers congeal the impact of contradictory forces and that these often frustrate a 
straightforward transformation in corporate return on capital employed (Froud et al, 2006: 
65-94).  
 
We have already noted that Sloan emphasised the relevance of the financial side of the 
business in explaining multi-divisionalization at GM (Sloan, 1964:140). This raises two 
interconnected questions: to what extent did GM’s corporate management of resources 
embody elements of the ‘financialized’ firm business model in its early history from 1909 to 
1940? And, if so, how did these elements contribute to the corporate development of this 
company? We first argue that GM distributed a significant share of its profits as dividends 
during the period from 1909 to 1940. These distributions were significant relative to the 
finance provided by stockholders but as Sloan also notes these stockholders needed to be 
called upon to re-finance GM as was the case intermittently over the period 1909 to 1940. 
Second we observe that GMs balance sheet asset structure shifts from predominantly 
tangible assets (plant and equipment land and buildings) towards financial assets (loans and 
notes receivable). This change in the structure of GM’s balance sheet is explained by 
consolidating the financial activities of the General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMACs) 
which issued credit/loans to customers to finance their car and truck purchases. This 
arrangement not only modified the composition of the asset-side of the balance sheet it also 
had the effect of inflating balance sheet capitalization relative to income. Third, GM operated 
a substantial stock option bonus scheme for senior executives and also for other less senior 
employees. This may have contributed to reducing employee turnover but it would also have 
served another purpose, as Sloan saw it, that of aligning the financial fortunes of the company 
with that of senior executives, employees and GM’s stockholders. Finally we consider the 
extent to which GMs financial performance was transformed by deconstructing the return on 
capital ratio into its constituent elements. In so doing we reveal that contradictory forces are 
in play limiting a transformation in the return on capital employed 
   
3. Financialized corporate behaviour in GM 1909-1940 
 
Lazonick (2015) has argued that US corporations have become financialized and in recent 
times are distributing over 60 per cent of their profits as dividends. This strategy of ‘downsize 
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and distribute, Lazonick argues, undermines the competitiveness of US corporations because 
they are not re-investing in product and process renewal which are essential for sustaining 
growth (Baumol, 2002).  Chart 1 reveals the share of dividends paid out of cash earnings for 
GM over the period 1909 to 1940. At the start of this period a relatively low share of cash 
earnings2 are distributed but thereafter, and for a majority of years, more than half of cash 
earnings are distributed. The average distribution ratio for the whole period 1909-1940 
averaged 70 per cent and the ratio using net earnings rather than cash earnings averaged 86 
per cent for the same period. The share of dividends paid out of net income by GM is generally 
above is that for US manufacturing as a whole where we estimate dividends averaged 70 per 
cent of reported net income (see table 1). 
 
Source: Source: For dividends GMI Alumi Foundations Collection of Industrial History, Flint 
Michigan, also 
http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/lippincott/corprpts/gm/gm1932.pdf 
Note: Cash earnings are approximated as net income adding back depreciation.  
Table 1: Total US manufacturing dividends and net Income for the period 1914-1940 
  Total net Income Total Dividends Dividends in net Income  
  $bn $bn % 
1914-1940 21.8 15.2 69.9 
 
Source US Department of Commerce Bureau of Census (1975) Historical Statistics of the US 
Colonial Times to 1970, part 2. Washington DC, US. Table series V 285-305: Assets, Liabilities 
and Selected Income items for two samples of large manufacturing corporations. 
                                            
2 cash earnings defined as net income adding back depreciation 
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Over the whole period 1909 to 1940 the accumulated value of dividends distributed to 
stockholders runs ahead of the original funds invested in the form of both ordinary and 
preference share capital.  By the end of our period of analysis, 1940, had stock holders 
participated in all follow-on financing events they would have collected accumulated 
dividends that exceeded their paid in capital by a ratio of 4:1. That is, for every $1 of capital 
invested stock holders would have received accumulated dividends equivalent to $4 (see 
chart 2).  
 
  
 
Source: Source: GMI Alumi Foundations Collection of Industrial History, Flint Michigan, also 
http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/lippincott/corprpts/gm/gm1932.pdf. 
Notes: Ordinary and preference dividends as a per cent of shareholder capital (preference 
and ordinary common stock investment made over the period 1909 to 1940) 
 
One explanation for GMs high dividend pay-out ratio could be that capital gains from holding 
GM stock were uncertain and volatile which was indeed the case. Chart 3 reveals for the 
period 1912 to 1925 GM stock prices are volatile and underperform the aggregate value index 
for US industry stocks. Although after 1925 GMs stock generally outperforms the industry 
average but market prices are still volatile. Throughout the whole period 1912-1938 
shareholder returns are increasingly driven by accumulated dividends received which from 
the mid-1930s run ahead of windfall gains accumulated from changes in GM’s quoted stock 
market prices (Chart 3).  Another explanation provided by Sloan is that the high dividends 
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distribution ratio secured the confidence of shareholders that might, at times, need to be 
called upon to provide refinancing to GM. 
Our shareholders have derived a substantial monetary benefit from the success of the 
business through the distribution of about two thirds3 of the income realised since 
inception a proportion which is larger than that distributed by most businesses. In 
order to secure these benefits, the shareholders have underwritten the growth of the 
enterprise by their willingness to reinvest substantial sums required to meet the needs 
of the business as it grew. (Sloan, 1964: 191) 
 
 
 
Source: For dividends GMI Alumi Foundations Collection of Industrial History, Flint Michigan, 
also http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/lippincott/corprpts/gm/gm1932.pdf 
For US and GM stock prices and all US industry sectors  
http://som.yale.edu/faculty-research/our-centers-initiatives/international-center-
finance/data/historical-cowles 
 
 
In the next section of this paper we review the changed structure of GMs balance sheet in 
terms of the ratio of tangible to financial assets and their financing. 
 
3.1 GM’s financialized balance sheet 1909 to 1940 
 
During the period 1909 to 1940 the asset structure of GMs balance sheet changes from 
predominantly tangible assets towards financial and more liquid assets. Tangible assets 
include: real estate plant and equipment whilst more liquid financial assets include: cash 
                                            
3 Note Sloan’s period covers 1917 -1962 in My Years with GM. 
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balances, marketable investments and loan notes outstanding (when GMAC4 starts its 
operations). Loan notes outstanding are those issued by GMAC to customers to finance credit 
purchases of GM cars and commercial vehicles and these are backed by equivalent liabilities 
(such as bonds). A significant development at GM was the use of bond finance to generate 
funds that could then be issued as loans to customers not only to purchase their first car from 
GM but to finance the purchase of second hand cars when these are traded in ‘two or three 
times on the way to the scrap heap’ (Sloan, 1964: 152).  Sloan comments that US retail banks 
had failed to provide consumer credit ‘they thought of the automobile as a sport and a 
pleasure....they had a moral objection to financing a luxury, believing apparently that 
whatever fostered consumption must discourage thrift. Consequently, automobiles were sold 
to customers mainly for cash’ (Sloan, 1964: 304) and not only were customers deprived of 
credit but also dealers seeking to finance inventory sitting on their retail sites and awaiting 
sale. Setting up GMAC not only facilitated the provision of loan finance to customers but 
helped to inflate demand and indirectly fuelled the imperative to co-ordinate productive 
facilities. 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation was organized in 1919 under the banking law 
of the State of New York for the purpose of assisting General Motors distributors, 
dealers and customers in financing cars purchased on credit. It was stated in the last 
annual report that this activity was assuming an increasing importance in the 
operations of General Motors to a degree that could hardly be overestimated.  
(General Motors Annual Report, 1926:9) 
 
We have built up a banking institution, the reputation of which is unquestioned. Its 
securities are considered of the highest rank by most conservative bankers and 
investors. Its record from the operating standpoint bears the closest inspection. As a 
matter of fact, I feel that its operations have had an important influence in establishing 
consumer credit as a sound and important principle in our business life.5 
 
So far as GMAC is concerned, I would say in brief that it offers a service related to the 
product and in the interest of the consumer. The advantages to the customer, the 
dealer, and the corporation seem obvious to me  
(Sloan, 1964: 312) 
 
                                            
4 GMAC = General Motors Acceptance Corporation founded in 1919 
5 Sloan, A. P., 28 Sept, 1927 GMI Institute Sloan A.P Biography Box C.2. 
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Sources: GMI Alumi Foundations Collection of Industrial History, Flint Michigan, also 
http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/lippincott/corprpts/gm/gm1932.pdf 
Notes: During the periods 1910-11, 1915-20 and 1919-34 cash balances are depleted and 
loans notes also lower due to the downturn in car sales in these recessionary periods.  
 
 
In chart 4 we calculate the ratio of financial liquid assets (cash, marketable securities and 
notes receivable in the GM accounts) to tangible assets (real estate plant and equipment). A 
simple trend of this ratio reveals a progressive adjustment in the composition of GM’s balance 
sheet as the ratio of financial and liquid assets to tangible assets increases. In 1920, after the 
establishment of GMAC, financial and liquid assets were equivalent to 27 per cent of tangible 
assets but by 1940 this ratio had inflated to the equivalent of 129 per cent of tangible asset 
values. In 1927 GM also established the Motors Accounting Company which provided an 
accounting and financial service to dealerships and this subsidiary later became the Motor 
Holdings Division which was financed with $2.5 million of GM funds. GM dealers were 
expected to put in a minimum of 25 per cent of their own capital and GM would make up the 
rest. GM’s share-holding in dealerships could be progressively purchased back by the dealer 
from bonuses received from the Motor Holdings Division so that eventually dealers could take 
full ownership of their dealership 
 
GMs balance sheet was progressively financialized during the period 1909 to 1940 driven by 
the provision of credit finance to customers that was otherwise not generally forthcoming 
from US retail banks. Analysis of GM’s annual report and accounts reveals that financial assets 
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(loans outstanding), associated with the provision of credit to customers, are an increasingly 
important component of balance sheet assets relative to tangible investment in buildings, 
plant and equipment. This financialization of GM’s balance sheet reflects a progressive 
changes in corporate priorities in terms of the need to underwrite dealership stock, finance 
car sales and realize a higher aggregate level of profit from volumes sold. We argue later that 
this increased capitalisation of GMs balance sheet reduced capital turnover (capital employed 
divided by sales) which acted to put a brake on the transformation of the return on capital 
employed. In the next section of this paper we turn to consider the use of stock options and 
bonuses at GM and note that whilst these schemes differ from modern company stock option 
schemes they served a similar purpose. This was to reward managers for improving GMs 
corporate profit (not individual divisions) and, as Sloan, understood it establishing ‘an identity 
of interest between management and shareholders’ (Sloan, 1964:408) 
  
3.2  Stock options and bonus schemes at GM  
 
In GM the average employee earned roughly $600 per annum in 1909 and earnings had risen 
to a peak of $1800 in 1928 only to recover back to and then surpass this level some ten years 
later in 1940 when average employee wages were roughly $2,000 per annum (see Chart 5). 
The GM annual report published in 1937 adjusts the average payroll per employee by the cost 
of living index to construct an argument that, in real terms, employees were on average better 
off than they were in 1929. 
 
In the Economic Review provided in the 1937 annual report we are told that: 
In 1929 the average annual earnings were approximately $1,440. In 1937, as has 
already been stated, they were $1,618. Thus a General Motors worker regularly 
employed throughout the year received 12% more in his pay envelope than he did in 
1929. The cost of livings index of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics was 
about 15% lower than in 1929, so that the 1937 average annual earnings of a General 
Motors worker, in terms of the goods he could buy, were approximately 32% greater 
than in 1919  
 
(General Motors Annual report 1937:45) 
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Sources: GMI Alumi Foundations Collection of Industrial History, Flint Michigan, also 
http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/lippincott/corprpts/gm/gm1932.pdf 
 
In addition to basic pay GM operated a series of bonus and investment schemes that 
encouraged senior, middle and lower ranking employees into GM stock ownership. According 
to Holdon: 
Du Pont and General Motors were among the first to confront the acute need to align 
the interests of management with shareholders—arising from the fact that, as large 
firms, it was not feasible for managers to own 100 per cent of the firm. These plans 
took a somewhat different form than modern stock option schemes  
(Holdon, 2005:135). 
 
Although Holdon points out that the GM stock bonus scheme differs from that of a modern 
stock option scheme it was a logical step in aligning managerial financial interest(s) with those 
of the shareholders (Holdon, 2005: 139). Participants in the GM stock option scheme would 
have been able to exercise their options after 18 months in employment even though issued 
options were good for 10 years (Sloan, 1964:  421). It was not uncommon by the mid-1920s 
for many of the major US corporations to offer their senior employees a stock option bonus 
scheme. According to Landry: 
By 1929, two-thirds of 100 largest manufacturing companies gave their president and 
vice-presidents both salaries and performance-based compensation. Academics and 
other observers in the 1920s applauded the rapid spread of bonus plans  
(Landry, 1995:15) 
 
In GM four financial incentive schemes were introduced: the managers’ securities company 
the bonus plan for salaries employees, and two opportunities for other employees: a savings 
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and investment plan and when these savings matured these funds could be converted to GM 
preferred stock at a 7 per cent return. Significantly, Sloan commits a full chapter to ‘incentive 
compensation’ (Sloan, 1964: Chapter 22) this chapter is twenty-two pages in length compared 
the chapter on co-ordination by committee and divisionalization (Sloan, 1964: Chapter 7) 
which is seventeen pages in length.  
 
At a senior level GM established the so-called Managers Securities Company in 19236, and 
this was funded by GM with an authorized capital stock of $33.8 million split into $28.8 million 
of 7 per cent preferred stock; $4 million of class A stock (par value $100) and $1 million of 
class B stock par value $25. An investment of $1,000 by a senior manager would have 
purchased 450 class A and B stock in 1923 but by 1930 an individuals holdings would have 
increased to 902 shares through exchanges, stock dividends and additional purchases made 
by the Management Securities Company (Raskob: 1927 132; Sloan, 1964:414). Raskob, then 
Chairman of its Finance Committee, observing that senior executives: by virtue of their 
extensive responsibility and authority, ‘have a definite financial share in the business, the 
equivalent of the rewards of private enterprise’ (Raskob, 1927:132). In 1930 the Managers 
Securities Company was closed and replaced by the ‘Management Corporation’ which 
purchased 1,375,000 GM shares at $40 per share (a total investment of $55 million). This 
initial transaction was financed by the sale of $5 million of Management Corporation shares 
to GM and issuance of a bond by the Management Corporation for $50 million also subscribed 
to by GM. Sloan (1964) observed that by 1937 the market price of GM stock held by the 
Management Corporation had increased from $40 to $65.375 and so the average executive 
shareholding of 179 shares had increased in value to $12,595 including dividends.  
 
In 1937 the highest-paid executives at GM were being paid 200 to 300 times the average 
earnings per employee (see table 2) with a significant component of remuneration derived 
from company-level profit participation schemes. This 300:1 ratio between senior staff and 
average employee pay was not out of line with ratios reported for the S&P 500 group in 20147   
  
                                            
6 Later replaced by the Management Corporation in 1930 
7 http://www.epi.org/publication/top-ceos-make-300-times-more-than-workers-pay-growth-surpasses-
market-gains-and-the-rest-of-the-0-1-percent/ 
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Table 2: GM senior management salary and bonuses, 1937 
All figures in $ Highest Paid Executive 
Management Group 
Second Highest 
paid 
Third Highest Paid 
Salary High 150,000 120,000 120,000 
Salary Low 112,500 76,666 90,000 
Profit 
Participation 
 
411,161 
 
387,450 
 
258,615 
Total Annual 561,161 507,450 353,655 
Relative to the 
average worker  
 
319 
 
288.6 
 
201.1 
 
Sources: 1937 GM annual report 1937, 45-48. 
http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/lippincott/corprpts/gm/gm1937.pdf 
Note: Average worker payroll was $1,758 in 1937. 
 
In the GM 1937 annual reports investors are informed that the senior executive group of 
administrative managers comprising 186 staff all received not only salaries but a share of 
profits. In 1937 this was equivalent to $0.16 per share when earnings per share were $4.38. 
Raskob observing that: 
It is the purpose of the General Motors’ plan of decentralized operations with co-
ordinated control to forge all these links in the chain of organization so as to unite in 
one common interest the welfare of the owners of the business with that of all 
members of the staff and working force; so that increased profits to the stockholders 
bring increased profits to those who helped earn them. 
(Raskob, 1927:134) 
 
 
And with regards to GMs administrative group  
The remuneration of the Corporation’s administrative staff is a personal relationship 
between each individual involved and the Corporation itself. It is held to be highly 
undesirable and contrary to the interest of the stockholders to approach the question 
from any other standpoint. On the other hand, it is recognised that the stockholders 
should be concerned, and have a right to be concerned, as to the cost of administering 
the business  
(General Motors Annual Report 1937:46) 
 
In 1937 all members of the organisation receiving an income of more than $4,200 were 
eligible to participate in the bonus fund. We estimate that the average benefit per employee 
involved in this scheme would have been around $100 per annum over the period 1918 to 
1940. Bonuses for all employees also included opportunities to be included in the savings and 
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investment plan introduced in 1919 where employees with three months or more of 
employment could enrol. This involved making a deposit up to a maximum of $300 per annum 
that GM would match with $0.50 for every dollar deposited. At the end of the investment 
term matured funds could be invested in GM preferred stock with GM adding an extra $2 per 
share invested and a follow-on fixed dividend of 7 per cent per annum. An employee 
depositing the maximum allowed over the period 1919 to 1927 would have accumulated a 
market value investment fund in excess of $6,000. Thus while the impact of bonus plan(s) 
could not be mathematically proven Sloan was assured that these contributed to the 
extraordinary successful performance of GM and the ‘retention of outstanding men’ (Sloan, 
1964:46). 
 
In the following section we consider the extent financialized corporate behaviour at GM 
transformed its return on capital employed over the period 1909 to 1940. This financial 
analysis differs from the return on invested assets often employed to evaluate divisional 
performance. The return on capital employed utilised in the analysis for this paper reflects 
the financial performance of the corporation as a whole and extent to which a higher level of 
earnings are being generated by capital employed.   
 
4.0. Financialization and corporate performance at GM (1909 to 1940) 
 
Our analysis starts with the GM’s physical output of cars and commercial vehicles over the 
period 1909 to 1940. Chart 6 reveals two distinct periods: a period of growth 1909 to 1929 
that is interrupted by cyclicality and a period from 1929 to 1939 where output peaked at 
roughly 2 million units in combination with significant bouts of cyclicality. 
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Source: GMI Alumi Foundation Collection of Industrial History, Flint Michigan, also 
http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/lippincott/corprpts/gm/gm1932.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GMI Alumi Foundation Collection of Industrial History, Flint Michigan, also 
http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/lippincott/corprpts/gm/gm1932.pdf 
Note: This calculation is total vehicles per employee 
Chart 7 reveals GMs productivity in terms of vehicles produced per employee that moves up 
from 2 vehicles per employee in 1909 to a peak of 10 vehicles per employee in 1925 but with 
a number of significant downturns during this time period. Thereafter productivity drops back 
to 5 vehicles per employee by 1932 before recovering back to 8 vehicles per employee by the 
mid to late 1930’s. This pattern of cyclical physical productivity has an approximate financial 
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correlate which is value added per employee.8 During the period 1909 to 1913 value added 
generated is about $1,000 per employee and reaches a peak in 1926 when the value added 
per employee reached $3,300 (Chart 8). As with physical productivity, financial productivity 
recovers after the 1929 to 1931 collapse but is no higher in 1940 than it was in 1925.  
 
Source: GMI Alumi Foundation Collection of Industrial History, Flint Michigan, also 
http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/lippincott/corprpts/gm/gm1932.pdf 
Note: Value added is calculated as net income plus depreciation expenses plus total 
employee payroll expenses 
 
4.1   GM: Cost Structure, margins and return on capital, 1909-1940 
 
In this section we consider the evolution of GM’s cost structure, profit margin and return on 
capital employed over the period 1909-1940. Our first key operating ratio is the value added 
to sales ratio. Value added is the financial fund that is captured by the firm after all external 
costs are deducted from sales revenue and the value added to sales ratio is an approximation 
of GM’s share of value captured from its value chain. During the period 1911-1924 this ratio 
remains relatively stable (apart from the initial start-up year) at roughly 30 per cent before 
gently rising towards 45 per cent. This increase in the value added to sales ratio reveals that 
GM had captured more of the total financial value chain within its own financial reporting 
boundary. However capturing more of the value chain did not translate into higher operating 
margins (cash earnings9 as a percent of sales) because an increased share of sales revenue 
                                            
8 Value added is employee costs plus earnings before depreciation, interest and tax. 
9 In this analysis for GM we define cash earnings as net income adding back depreciation. 
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was spent on employment costs with these rising from 20 to 30 percent of sales as more work 
is undertaken in-house. This leaves GM’s cash margin structurally untransformed and cyclical 
corresponding to the changes in output and oscillating sales revenue. Although the cash 
margin remains relatively untransformed we now turn to consider if this was this also the case 
for the cash return on capital employed. The cash return on capital employed is found by 
dividing capital intensity (capital employed/ sales) into the cash margin (cash earnings /sales)  
 
[Cash earnings / Sales]  
__________________ 
 
 [Capital Employed / Sales] 
 
Although the cash margin was relatively untransformed at GM it is possible that capital 
intensity is falling (capital employed / sales) thereby inflating the return on capital. 
 
Source: GM Annual Reports and Financial Statements 1909 to 1940 GMI Alumi Foundation 
Collection of Industrial History, Flint Michigan, also 
http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/lippincott/corprpts/gm/gm1932.pdf 
Note: Value added, labour costs and cash margin expressed as a percent of sales income 
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Source: GM Annual Reports and Financial Statements 1909 to 1940 GMI Alumi Foundation 
Collection of Industrial History, Flint Michigan, also 
http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/lippincott/corprpts/gm/gm1932.pdf 
Note: CII GMAC= capital intensity index which is capital employed divided by sales where 
capital employed is long term debt plus equity. From 1923 onwards we also include notes 
receivable recorded in the GMAC accounts. 
 
The analysis reveals that GM’s capital intensity10 (including GMAC loan notes), increases from 
around 50 per cent of sales revenue during the 1910s to a level that was equivalent, and at 
times, above sales revenue during the 1930s. In combination a relatively untransformed cash 
margin combined with higher capital intensity as GM employed more capital to finance loans 
to customers and finance its dealerships. GM’s financing of loans to customers also acts to 
put a structural brake on the transformation of GM’s return on capital (Chart 11). These trade- 
offs between the cash margin, capital intensity and return on capital employed were 
understood by Donaldson Brown.11 Sloan himself observed that: ‘Brown defined the return 
on investment as a function of the profit margin and the rate of turnover of invested capital 
(Sloan, 1964:141). 
 
 
 
 
                                            
10 Capital intensity is calculated capital employed [ debt plus equity in GM plus GMAC loan notes outstanding’ 
divided by sales  
11 Donaldson Brown arrived at GM in 1922 and was elected to the Executive Committee. He was experienced 
in financial operations. 
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If this seems obscure, pass over it and note only that you can get an increase in return 
on investment by increasing the rate of turnover of capital in relation to sales as well 
as by increasing profit margins. Each of these two elements –profit margin and rate of 
turnover of capital –Mr Brown broke into its detailed components, a case you might 
say of aggregating and disaggregating figures to bring about a recognition of the 
structure of the profit and loss in operations. Essentially it was a matter of making 
things visible (Sloan, 1964:142) 
 
 
 
Source: GM Annual Reports and Financial Statements 1909 to 1940 GMI Alumi Foundation 
Collection of Industrial History, Flint Michigan, also 
http://www.library.upenn.edu/collections/lippincott/corprpts/gm/gm1932.pdf 
Note: Cash ROCE is net earnings before depreciation divided into capital employed. The 
Cash ROCE (GMAC) includes notes receivable at GMAC in the capital employed figure for 
illustration. 
 
In chart 11 we combine capital turnover and cash margin to obtain the cash return on capital 
employed (CROCE). We find that over the period 1909-1940 there is a cyclical pattern to the 
return on capital invested and that a simple trend line registers a relatively flat overall picture 
of roughly a 20 per cent cash return on capital. Splitting this into two sub-periods before 
Sloan’s chairmanship of GM the average CROCE was 16 per cent and in the period of his 
chairmanship (1923 to 1940) the average stood at 17 per cent. We should also note that under 
Sloan’s chairmanship GM distributed over 80 per cent of its net income and this would have 
mechanically slowed down the accumulation of shareholder funds (retained profits carried 
forward would be lower) and this, in turn, would mechanically inflate capital turnover 
generating an additional uplift to the reported CROCE (see chart 7). 
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Our analysis of both financial and physical productivity at GM during the period 1909 to 1940 
reveals that growth was interrupted by significant bouts of cyclicality. Although GM managed 
to capture a greater share of its financial value chain this did not translate into a higher cash 
margin because there is an offsetting increase in labour costs in sales revenue. We observe a 
similar trade-off between the cash margin and capital intensity as GM accumulated additional 
capital to finance loans made to customers. However these trades offs were well known to 
those managing GM’s operations. Donaldson Brown understood that inflated balance sheet 
capitalisation from loans made to customers would reduce capital turnover but this was a 
necessary sacrifice if volume sales were to be maintained. Froud et al (2006) in their chapter 
on ‘Financialization and Corporate Performance’ argue that claims about financial 
transformation (such as that regarding the return on capital employed) often turn out to be 
disappointing because contradictory forces are in play noting that:  
 
‘the responsibility of management is not simply to raise earnings but also to resist any 
increase in the capital base that is not justified by current or future earnings. In 
practice, this may be hard to do if acquisitions or development of new activities such 
as financial services are attractive because, for instance, they help reduce cyclicality 
of earnings or boost top-line growth, even if they also bring significant additional debt 
or other liabilities’.  
(Froud et al, 2006:81) 
 
 
In this paper we have deconstructed the bottom line CROCE for GM to reveal how trade-offs 
between: growth in revenue, profits and balance sheet capitalisation and how these 
interlocking arrangements captured in the numerator and denominator of the ratio can 
frustrate financial transformation.   
 
5. Summary/ Discussion  
 
Chandler’s (1964) text on ‘Strategy and Structure’ emphasised the importance of organisation 
structure and strategy governing the productive stewardship of resources and how this 
explained the rise of the modern corporation. Lazonick (2015) compares this productive ‘old 
economy’ business model with that of a ‘new economy’ ‘financialized business model’ where 
financial incentives have encouraged managers to extract value for their shareholders. This 
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Lazonick argues, leaves US firms vulnerable because resources are not being re-invested to 
sustain innovation, growth and competitiveness. The new economy mode of corporate 
behaviour is described as being ‘financialized’ because managers are focussed on reconciling 
resource stewardship with the financial demands of shareholders and the capital market. In 
this paper we employ the literature on financialization to frame the argument and analysis: 
first Krippner’s (2005) observation that financialization is about the growth of corporate 
financial assets relative to tangible assets where non-financial firms are beginning to resemble 
financial firms in some cases ‘closely’. Second Lazonick’s observations about how managerial 
incentives, in the form of bonuses and stock options, encouraged higher levels of earnings 
distribution at the expense of productive renewal. Finally Froud et al’s (2006) argument that 
managers, in financialized firms, construct narratives that often exaggerate the potential for 
financial transformation to boost stock prices. The discrepancy between narrative promise(s) 
and financial performance outcomes can be understood by deconstructing ratios such as the 
return on capital employed. This process of deconstruction, employed by Froud et al, reveals 
how contradictory forces are in play in the financialized firm, for example, additional 
investment may stimulate growth in sales but not necessarily deliver a growth in earnings and 
so the return on capital is not transformed.  
 
Our analysis reveals that there was a progressive shift in the asset structure of GMs balance 
sheet from tangible to more liquid financial assets. This change in asset structure reflects the 
use of financial instruments within GMAC (and GM) to underwrite the provision of credit to 
customers which, in turn, sustained higher demand, revenues and profits than would 
otherwise have been the case. We also find that a significant share of GM’s earnings were 
distributed to its stockholders and we estimate that the distribution ratio out of profits (net 
income) averaged over 80 per cent compared to the US manufacturing average of 70 percent 
over a similar time period. This provided stockholder rentiers with a substantial return on 
their original and follow-on invested equity capital. GM’s financial underwriting established 
bonus schemes for administrators and employees, including the Managers Securities 
Company (later Management Corporation) which purchased GM stock options for senior 
executives. Sloan (1964) observed that the stock option and bonus schemes helped retain 
senior executives but also served the purpose of aligning the financial interests of senior 
executives and employees with those of GMs stockholders.   
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Point values and ratios are often utilised by analysts and researchers to construct narratives 
and interpretations about the transformation of corporate financial performance (Haslam et 
al, 2013). Froud et al (2006) argue that in the financialized firm managerial narratives often 
promise more than they can deliver and deconstruct key financial ratios such as ROCE to 
reveal how contradictory forces limit financial transformation. Donaldson Brown also 
understood that GM’s return on capital employed is a ratio with a numerator and 
denominator that could be deconstructed into constituent elements to reveal confounding 
and contradictory forces. Brown describes the return on capital invested as a function of 
profit margins combined with the rate of capital turnover. Profit margins can be affected by 
changes in value added captured from the firm’s value chain and how much of this is then 
distributed to employees as wages and salaries. So that whilst GM captured more of the 
financial value chain the company’s increased expenditure on employment costs restricted 
transformation of the profit margin. Furthermore, return on capital employed as Donaldson 
Brown considered it was also affected by capital turnover (sales revenues divided by capital 
employed). The inflation of capital employed, resulting from financing loan credit to 
customers, enabled GM to recover additional revenue and profits but it also came at the 
expense of reducing the rate of capital turnover and this, in turn, limited the transformation 
of return on capital.  
 
The purpose of this paper has been to explore the extent to which elements of a new 
economy financialized business model were present during GMs early corporate 
development. At a company level we find that many of these elements were present and had 
an impact on resource stewardship and corporate behaviour. There are of course various 
corporate logics and arguments employed to justify the shift by GM into financial services, 
introduce stock options and incentives and distribute a high proportion of earnings back to 
shareholders. Behind all of these interventions is a motivation to improve financial 
performance, in terms of generating a higher return on capital. However, as Froud et al 
observe, these financialized endeavours are also fraught with contradiction and ambiguity 
and these are rendered visible when financial ratios are deconstructed into their constituent 
top and bottom line elements.   
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